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A MICRO-MICROECONOMIC APPROACH 
TO ANTITRUST LAW: GAMES 
MANAGERS PLAY 
Harry S. Gerla* 
Classical microeconomic theory (sometimes known as Chicago 
School Economics) has become the dominant tool for contemporary 
antitrust analysis. I In the academic realm, no instructor could in good 
conscience ignore the antitrust views of the Chicago School.2 Classical 
microeconomics has also gained great influence among antitrust 
courts. 3 Indeed, judicial acceptance of the Chicago School's version of 
antitrust law and economics may have reached a new high-water mark 
with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 4 
In Matsushita, American electronic manufacturers claimed that 
their Japanese rivals conspired to take over the American consumer 
electronics market by agreeing to maintain artificially high prices in 
the Japanese home market while maintaining predatorily low prices in 
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A. 1970, Queens College; M.A. 
1972, University of Florida; J.D. 1975, Ohio State University. - Ed. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the suggestions and criticisms made by Barbara Ullman Gerla, Attorney at Law. 
I. See, e.g., Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the 
Chicago School, 1982 SUP. Cr. REv. 319; Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger 
Court's Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1982); Marko· 
vits, The Burger Court and Antitrust Analysis, in THE BURGER COURT 182 (V. Blasi ed. 1983). 
The terms "microeconomics," "classical microeconomics," and "Chicago School Econom· 
ics" are used interchangeably throughout this article. As far as antitrust law and policy are 
concerned, the two primary articles of faith of Chicago School Economics are (1) that overall 
wealth maximization (regardless of distributional consequences) should be the sole goal of the 
antitrust laws, and (2) classical microeconomics, also known as price theory, is the only useful 
tool for determining if wealth is being maximized. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chi· 
cago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 226 (1985). For a more extended exposition of the Chicago 
School's view, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); and Posner, The Chicago School 
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). 
2. Gellhorn & Robinson, The Role of Economic Analysis in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL 
Eo. 247, 255 (1983). 
3. See, e.g., Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-56 (1977); Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. 
Ct. 880 (1987); Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1221-22 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(Jones, J., concurring), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting 
Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986). 
4. 475 U.S. 574 (1986), revg. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d 
Cir. 1983), a.ffg. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 
1981). 
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the American market. 5 The Supreme Court reversed the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and upheld the district 
court's summary judgment decision in favor of the defendants. 6 What 
is significant about the majority opinion in Matsushita is that it uti-
lized the abstract principles of classical microeconomics to conclude 
that the plaintiffs' claim in the case was implausible and thus subject 
to dismissal on motion for summary judgment. 7 In doing so, the 
Court ignored plaintiffs' evidence that defendants had initiated a pred-
atory pricing conspiracy: "[E]xpert opinion evidence of below-cost 
pricing has little probative value in comparison with the economic fac-
tors ... that suggest that such conduct is irrational."8 
Thus, in Matsushita the Court adopted the essential reasoning of 
modem microeconomics. This reasoning begins with the assumptions 
that firms have as their prime goal the maximization of profits and 
that they will act rationally in pursuit of that goal. 9 According to 
some Chicago School economists, predatory pricing is not a rational 
method of maximizing profits.10 The inexorable conclusion under this 
view is that the real-life firms in Matsushita did not engage in preda-
tory pricing. 
The central weakness of both classical microeconomic theory in 
general and the analytical approach employed by the majority opinion 
in Matsushita in particular is that both overlook an obvious point. 
Firms cannot act on their own. The actions of firms are the actions of 
the human beings who act as their managers. 11 The prime objective of 
these managers is the advancement of their careers. The styles and 
methods of contemporary American management often lead to a con-
flict between the steps necessary (or perceived as necessary) to advance 
a manager's career and the steps needed to ensure the long-run success 
of the manager's employer. 12 In the face of such a conflict, it would 
take a saint to pick the latter course, and saints are in as short supply 
5. 475 U.S. at 577-78. 
6. 475 U.S. at 576-77. 
7. 475 U.S. at 588-95. 
8. 475 U.S. at 594 n.19. 
9. See, e.g., Flynn, Appendix: Definitions and Assumptions of Economic Analysis, 12 Sw. U. 
L. REV. 361, 369-70 (1981); Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 228. 
10. E.g., R. BORK, supra note 1, at 149-55; Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-
strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264-65 (1981); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & 
EcoN. 289, 294-300 (1980). The Court in Matsushita relied on these authorities to conclude that 
the plaintiffs' claim of a predatory pricing scheme was implausible as a matter oflaw. 475 U.S. at 
588-90. 
11. See M. GREEN & J. BERRY, THE CHALLENGE OF HIDDEN PROFITS: REDUCING COR-
PORATE BUREAUCRACY AND WASTE 13-14 (1985). 
12. See Part I infra. 
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among management as they are among the rest of humanity. Classical 
microeconomic theory, with its operative assumption of rational, 
profit-maximizing firms, ignores this messy reality. As a consequence, 
predictions of the effects of antitrust laws and policies derived from 
classical microeconomic theory are often simply wrong. 13 
If we are to gain an accurate perspective on the impact of antitrust 
laws and policies on the behavior of firms in the real world, we must 
adopt a micro-microeconomic approach which focuses not on how ra-
tional, profit-maximizing firms will theoretically behave, but upon 
how late twentieth-century American managers and executives actu-
ally behave. This article attempts to begin that task. 
Part I of this article examines the justifications for focusing on in-
dividual managers rather than profit-maximizing firms as the key ac-
tors in antitrust law. Part II looks at contemporary management 
mores and practices and develops some generalized "rules of the 
game" for how managers advance their careers in present-day Ameri-
can firms. Finally, Part III applies the rules to predict how managers 
might well guide their firms in three scenarios vital to modern anti-
trust law: entry into new markets, exclusion of competitors, and collu-
sion among competitors.14 
I. WHY MANAGERS AND NOT FIRMS? 
In classical microeconomic theory, managers are pictured as vir-
tual automatons, generally behaving in a manner consistent with the 
long-run profit-maximization of their firms. 15 While some managers 
13. Matsushita itself may be the best example of a case in which the simplifying assumptions 
of classical microeconomics led to erroneous conclusions in antitrust Jaw. In reaching its conclu· 
sion that the defendants in Matsushita could not possibly have entered into a predatory-pricing 
conspiracy, the majority completely ignored what we know about business psychology in general, 
and Japanese business psychology and sociology in particular. For a devastating critique of Mat· 
sushita along these lines see Crew, Matsushita v. Zenith: The Chicago School Teaches the 
Supreme Court a Dubious Lesson, ANTITRUST, Fall 1986, at 11. 
14. The scenarios discussed in this article are the ones in which a micro-microeconomic ap· 
proach focusing on managers as the key actors will likely have the most utility for antitrust lnw. 
This does not mean that such an approach will not prove helpful in other areas of antitrust law. 
For example, classical microeconomics suggests that firms impose vertical restraints because 
these provide the most efficient means for distributing wares. H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 252 (1985). Close examination of the actual restraints from a 
micro-microeconomic perspective may show that in fact the restraints are imposed for the con· 
venience of the managers rather than for the benefit of their employers. 
In a recent article, Professor Hovenkamp challenges those who believe that firms do not act 
as rational profit-maximizers to demonstrate how that fact is relevant to contemporary antitrust 
law. See Hovenkamp, supra note l, at 228 n.77. Responding to his challenge is one goal of the 
discussion in Part III. 
15. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM· 
ANCE 29 (2d ed. 1980); Henderson, Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprison-
ment of Corporate Rationality, SB N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 769 (1983); Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 
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undoubtedly behave in such a manner, most persons familiar with the 
real world of firms recognize that managers tend to pursue policies 
which do not maximize their firms' profits. 16 Managers pursue 
nonmaximizing policies for two reasons. First, there is a gap between 
what managers perceive as the best methods for maximizing their 
firms' long-term profitability and the policies which in fact will accom-
plish that objective. Often the techniques, shibboleths, and styles of 
modern "scientific" management, which many managers fervently be-
lieve to be the path to success for their firms, lead to decreased profit-
ability for the company. Firms engage in nonmaximizing behavior, 
not necessarily because of some nefarious conflict of interest on the 
part of their management, but because the managers erroneously be-
lieve that their management practices will lead to long-run profitabil-
ity for the firm. 
The response of many American firms to foreign competition pro-
vides an excellent example of how management style can cause firms 
to act differently from the manner predicted by the profit-maximiza-
tion hypothesis. Numerous sectors of the American economy are suf-
fering from an onslaught of foreign competition. 17 An increasing 
number of commentators have focused on management inadequacies 
as the culprit in the decline of American competitiveness. Critics of 
American management have pointed out that prevalent practices such 
as overemphasizing quantitative measures of performance, treating la-
bor as simply a factor of production rather than a human resource, 
and focusing on short-run profit-maximization to the exclusion of 
long-run concerns have hurt the ability of United States firms to com-
pete against their European and Far-Eastern rivals. 18 The managers 
who utilize these practices are not attempting to injure their own 
firms. The managers are in fact attempting to assist their firms by 
using orthodox "modern" management techniques. Nonetheless, the 
practices are dysfunctional in the face of present-day foreign competi-
tion. If the managers of firms were the profit-maximizing automatons 
postulated by classical microeconomists, American firms would not 
228; Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 547-48 
(1985). 
16. E.g., W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 45-52 (1967); P. 
DRUCKER, TOWARD THE NEXT ECONOMICS AND OTHER EssAYS 14 (1981); M. GREEN & J. 
BERRY, supra note 11, at 13-14. 
17. See, e.g., W. ABERNATHY, K. CLARK & A. KANTROW, INDUSTRIAL RENAISSANCE 9-14 
(1983); R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 117-27 (1983); L. THUROW, THE ZERO· 
SUM SOLUTION 47-52 (1985). 
18. E.g., R. HAYES & S. WHEELWRIGHT, RESTORING OUR COMPETITIVE EDGE 7-19 
(1984); P. PASCARELLA, THE NEW ACHIEVERS 157-72 (1984); R. REICH, supra note 17, at 140-
45, 157-72; L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 144-57. 
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overly rely on quantitative measures, treat labor as a mere commodity, 
or focus only on the short run. The widespread persistence of these 
practices among American managers indicates that, contrary to the 
Chicago School model, one cannot simply assume that firms and their 
managers will act as rational profit-maximizers. The styles and tech-
niques which prevail among individual managers can and do lead 
firms to take paths radically different from those predicted by the 
profit-maximization hypothesis. 
The second reason why managers pursue policies which do not 
maximize the long-term profitability of their firms is that the interests 
of the managers diverge from the interests of the firms or their share-
holders. The seminal source for the concept of a split between owner-
ship and management interest is, of course, Berle and Means's 
pioneering work in the late 1920s and early 1930s.19 Classical 
microeconomists have expended a great deal of effort in attempting to 
discredit the Berle and Means thesis that modern corporations are 
controlled by managers furthering their personal interests rather than 
the shareholders' interests.20 Nonetheless, the track record of contem-
porary American management provides strong anecdotal support for 
the notion that managers will often be faced with choices between ac-
tions which promote their careers and actions which promote the 
long-range viability of their firms, and when faced with such a choice, 
will pick the former. 
Two areas of modern management behavior provide particularly 
apt examples. The first is simple corporate waste and inefficiency.21 
Waste and inefficiency are inimical to the financial health of both the 
corporation and its shareholders. In the make-believe world of classi-
cal microeconomics, rational managers would not engage in wasteful 
or inefficient practices except perhaps by mistake, and those who make 
mistakes too frequently would be swiftly eliminated by an efficient and 
unforgiving market. 22 In the real world, however, managers fre-
19. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
20. See, e.g., Corporations and Private Property, 26 J.L. & ECON. 235 (1983). For modem 
defenses of the Berle & Means thesis, see A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xxix-xxxi, 358-59 (rev. ed. 1967); R. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CON-
TROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION 9-24 (1970). 
21. The term "waste" refers to what Green and Berry call "avoidable waste" - waste caused 
by "decisions that [managers] know, or should know, will cost more than they yield." M. 
GREEN & J. BERRY, supra note 11, at 13. This is similar to the concept of X-inefficiency devel-
oped by economist Harvey Leibenstein. Professor Leibenstein defines X-inefficiency as "all types 
of inefficiencies resulting from the complete or partial lack of motivation to use economic oppor-
tunities as effectively as they might be used." Leibenstein, Microeconomics and X-efficiency The-
ory: If There Is No Crisis, There Ought To Be, in THE CRISIS IN EcONOMIC THEORY 97, 98 (D. 
Bell & I. Kristo! eds. 1981 ). 
22. F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 38. 
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quently engage in wasteful and inefficient behavior. 23 Economist Har-
vey Leibenstein estimates that between twenty and forty percent of the 
net national economic product is wasted through what he terms "X-
inefficiency" and that waste by firms is the major source of this loss. 24 
In the world of the corporation, much of the inefficiency can be 
traced to managers' attempts to pursue their own goals rather than to 
maximize their firms' profitability (or, to be more accurate, to mini-
mize their firms' costs). Professor Leibenstein recounts an illustrative 
anecdote. During the 1920s, future historian Eleanor Dulles was 
working in a hairnet factory when she devised a worker-incentive sys-
tem under which workers would be rewarded with a thirty to forty 
percent increase in wages for a fifty percent increase in productivity.25 
The system was a success, and several of the best workers began earn-
ing significantly increased wages while the factory's productivity and 
profitability surged. The rational, profit-maximizing manager, of 
course, would have been delighted with the new system. In actuality, 
the manager of the plant (who was not the owner of the company) 
discouraged worker participation in the plan and eventually wrecked 
the system because he did not want the better workers "thinking they 
are good ... [and getting] above themselves."26 The incentive system 
was clearly in the best interests of the owners of the firm. However, it 
was not maintained because the plant manager placed his own interest 
in status and perceived authority over the interests of the firm. 
The second prevailing pattern which tends to confirm the thesis 
that the interests of managers diverge from those of their employers is 
the behavior of management in modem corporate takeover battles. 27 
23. See, e.g., M. GREEN & J. BERRY, supra note 11. The existence of vast waste and ineffi-
ciency should come as no surprise. As Professor Scherer has noted, "[a]nyone with the remotest 
knowledge of real-world organizations must recognize that something resembling X-inefficiency 
exists." F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 464. Economist Shlomo Maita! puts the matter even 
more bluntly: "Readers with experience in the business world may be bemused that economists 
even question the existence of X-inefficiency. An entire branch of psychology, organizational 
behavior, is built on the assumption that X-inefficiency ... is alive and well." S. MAITAL, 
MINDS, MARKETS, AND MONEY 112 (1982). For a summary of rigorous empirical research on 
the existence of X-inefficiencies, see H. LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN 34-44 (1976). 
24. Leibenstein, supra note 21, at 108. 
25. Id. at 97. 
26. Id. 
27. Ironically, the Chicago School has been vigorous in pointing out how managers can act 
contrary to shareholder interests during takeover fights. To quote Judge Easterbrook, "[m]any 
managers ... want to be secure in their jobs; the Chicago School generally supports free competi-
tion in the market for corporate control, even though this terrifies managers." Easterbrook, 
Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1706 n.25 (1986). For a thorough survey and 
evaluation of the empirical studies on the adverse impact of management antitakeover techniques 
on shareholder interests, see Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Of-
fers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984). For a succinct summary of the various types of antitake-
over tactics utilized by management, see R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 571-77 (1986). 
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When managers utilize tactics such as "scorched-earth policies" (sell-
ing profitable divisions at below-market prices to make their compa-
nies less attractive to corporate raiders), purchasing divisions simply 
to raise antitrust problems for potential suitors, or paying "greenmail" 
to corporate raiders, 28 they can hardly be said to be acting in their 
firm's best interest. The use of such tactics supports the view that 
management is more interested in maintaining short-run job tenure 
than in running an efficient firm that will be viable in the long run. 
The ease with which modern managers place their own interests 
abo.ve those of their corporations should come as no surprise. Many of 
the mechanisms which economists argued would prevent such a devel-
opment not only have proven to be ineffective, but have actually en-
couraged managers to place their personal interests above those of 
their employers. The ineffectiveness of shareholders and boards of di-
rectors in supervising management has been discussed by many com-
mentators. 29 The ultimate discipline for management, the Darwinian 
marketplace, may weed out firms whose managers look too much to 
their own goals, but the pressure exerted)by that marketplace may be 
diminished by factors such as noncompetitive markets and sloth by 
rivals' managements.30 Managers can fail to operate at top efficiency 
or to maximize the long-run profits of their firm without necessarily 
leading the firm to destruction.31 Even if management's actions end in 
the destruction of the firm, the managers may not necessarily have to 
face the consequences of their decisions. 
One of the characteristics of contemporary American firms is the 
28. R. CLARK, supra note 27, at 571-77. For a more detailed discussion of the deleterious 
effect on shareholder interests of paying "greenmail," see Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agree-
ments, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J, FIN. 
ECON. 275 (1983). 
29. E.g., E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 30-48 (1981); M. MACE, 
DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 43-71 (1971); E. MCSWEENEY, MANAGING THE MANAGERS 
105-07 (1978); Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 597, 610-16 (1982). 
30. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 38. 
31. In addition to market or competitive managerial imperfections, another factor that can 
dampen the Darwinian struggle is a managerial policy of "satisficing." Satisficing refers to a 
policy of generating satisfactory profits, rather than maximal profits. See, e.g., R. CYERT & J, 
MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 26-44 (1963); Simon, Theories of Decisiotz-Mak-
ing in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AMER. ECON. REV. 253, 262-65 (1959). 
Furthermore, firms are often so large or resilient that they can absorb a great deal of misman-
agement without being driven to the brink. In recent years, the challenge of Japanese competi-
tion has exposed the pervasively poor management practices of American automobile companies. 
See D. HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING (1986); B. YATES, TH
0
E DECLINE AND FALL OF THE 
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 242-52 (1983); see also W. ABERNATHY, K. CLARK & A. 
KANTROW, supra note 17, at 72-94. While poor management in the face of effective foreign 
competition did almost bankrupt Chrysler and American Motors, General Motors and Ford 
were far from destroyed, although they were seriously damaged. The firms were simply big 
enough to tolerate persistent mismanagement. 
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short job tenure of many of their executives. In contrast to Japanese 
firms, American executives tend to change employers frequently.32 If 
the consequences of bad management practices are felt after an execu-
tive has left the firm, that executive may escape blame. Indeed, under 
some circumstances, the former executive's reputation may be en-
hanced by his prior bad management practices. For example, take the 
chief executive officer (CEO) of a manufacturing concern. The CEO 
may be faced with a decision of whether to invest in research and de-
velopment which will ensure the firm's competitive position in future 
years. If the CEO chooses not t9 make the investment, the firm will be 
able to show higher current income and dividends. The CEO may 
then be hired at a new firm on the basis of the enhanced earnings of his 
previous employer. When the CEO's previous employer begins reap-
ing the consequences of its failure to invest in research and develop-
ment, the blame may not fall on the departed CEO's decisions, but on 
the CEO's departure.33 
Finally, the nature of the securities markets may exacerbate the 
tendency of managers to look to their own i~terests. Some 
microeconomists have argued that the securities markets force execu-
tives to attempt to maximize their firm's profits.34 These economists 
claim that if profits are not maximized, the value of the firm's stock 
will drop, making the firm a prime takeover target and the firm's man-
agement vulnerable to displacement if such a takeover occurs. 35 
Under this view, the securities markets exercise a disciplinary effect 
which causes the interests of a firm and its management to converge. 
However, even if such a disciplinary effect exists, the discipline of the 
32. See L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 149-50; Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to 
Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 74. 
33. The failure to draw the connection between the CEO's past policies and his former firm's 
present difficulties will probably be the result of a combination of mental laziness and ideology. 
As economist Lester Thurow points out, evaluating performance on the basis of simple short-
run, bottom-line figures is relatively easy. L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 152. Judging how well 
an executive has positioned his firm for the future "requires real skill," which many executives 
and directors have been unwilling or unable to exercise. Id. The discounting of short-run profit 
data and the visualization of a linkage between a manager's past policies and a firm's present 
problems take similar skills. There is no more incentive for evaluators to try to abandon simple 
mechanical rules in favor of tough judgment calls in this situation than there is in any other 
situation involving executives. Moreover, if the CEO pursued short-run policies which success-
fully inflated the price of the former employer's stock (as is quite likely), the claim that the 
policies were actually destructive of the long-range future of the firm would likely be ignored by 
those who believe that the stock markets are efficient and reflect accurately all known informa-
tion about a company. For an exposition of the efficient-market hypothesis, see Fama, Efficient 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
34. See, e.g., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 
(1965). 
35. See id. 
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stock markets may push managers to take steps which perhaps are in 
their own short-term interests, but damage the firm in the long-run. 
Examination of the psychological time frame of managers illus-
trates this phenomenon. As will be discussed later, managers tend to 
refuse to engage in projects which do not show profitability in a year 
or two, no matter how vital the project is for the long-term stability of 
the firm. 36 The stock markets in general, and institutional investors in 
particular, also seem to be more interested in short-run profits than in 
long-term viability.37 Thus, the discipline of the markets may push 
managers to take steps which increase immediate profitability (and, 
given short job tenure, the manager's stature) at the expense of long-
term survivability.38 For example, managers of many American firms 
have chosen to forego needed commitments to research and develop-
ment, or to new plants and equipment, because such commitments will 
diminish short-run earnings and dividends which in turn may lower 
the market value of a firm's stock. 39 In these cases, the "rational" firm 
would be interested in maintaining its competitive position and surviv-
ing over the long term. If the managers were rational profit-maximiz-
ers, they would make the necessary investments. Instead, the 
perceived need to please securities markets and avoid hostile takeovers 
forces managers to sacrifice long-term survivability for short-term 
profit. In these cases, the securities markets have not unified the inter-
36. See notes 42-47 infra and accompanying text. 
37. See L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 156. 
38. Id. at 150. While this article suggests that the managers offirms often do what is neces· 
sary for the advancement of their careers rather than for the survival of their firms, it does not 
mean to suggest that business executives are unique in this behavior. Such behavior may be 
common to all leaders of bureaucratic organizations. Indeed, an analogous process is now occur-
ring in labor unions. Most labor leaders claim that organizing is crucial for the continued sur-
vival of the labor movement. See, e.g., Kuttner, Will Unions Organize Again?, DISSENT, Winter 
1987, at 52, 55. However, there is little internal pressure within unions to organize. In fact, the 
job of organizer is generally a low-status, low-paying job within a union. Id. Being a union 
organizer is not the way to advance within a union. Instead, the business agent, who deals with 
the needs of current members, is at the top of the hierarchy of jobs in a union. Id. As a conse-
quence, the work of organizing languishes even though it is crucial to the long-term survival of 
the union. Id. Just as catering to the needs of current shareholders, even at the expense of the 
firm and future shareholders, is the way to advance within a firm, catering to current members' 
needs, even at the expense offuture members and the union itself, seems to be the way to advance 
within a union. 
39. See L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 150. The managers who fail to make needed invest-
ment in plant and equipment may not be acting out of selfish motives, but out of sincere if 
mistaken views on sound management. As Professors Hayes and Garvin of the Harvard Busi-
ness School point out, the widely used analytical techniques used to discount investments in plant 
and equipment to present value lead to a systematic erroneous bias against making investments in 
productive technology, capacity, and worker skills. Hayes & Garvin, Managing as If Tomorrow 
Mattered, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1982, at 70, 71. The widespread utilization of analytical 
techniques which lead to erroneous results once again demonstrates the absurdity of the assump-
tion that managers are robot-like profit-maximizers. It also underscores the importance of ana-
lyzing how real-world managers in fact make decisions. 
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ests of a firm and its management, as predicted by some 
microeconomists, but have caused the two interests to draw even far-
ther apart. 
In sum, the record of contemporary management strongly suggests 
that we must look to actual management beliefs and practices in order 
to predict the behavior of real-world firms; we cannot assume that 
managers are merely profit-maximizing robots. This article will now 
turn to such an examination. 
II. THE RULES OF THE GAME FOR MANAGERIAL ADVANCEMENT 
Any attempt to describe a contemporary American "style" of 
management must inevitably lead to oversimplification. Given the 
plethora of firms and managers, a myriad of exceptions to any sys-
tematized portrait of American management is bound to exist. 40 
Nonetheless, the characteristics of American management discussed in 
this section are sufficiently widespread and salient that they affect the 
performance of American firms vis-a-vis their foreign competition on a 
macro level.41 Therefore, these characteristics can be used to make 
generalized predictions on how real-world firms are likely to perform 
in situations involving the application of the federal antitrust laws. 
The modes and methods of modern American management give rise 
to four "rules of the game" for managers who wish to advance their 
careers. 
The first rule of the modern management game is that a manager's 
and firm's success is to be judged by bottom-line financial measures 
such as current earnings or short-term return on investment.42 Both 
top and middle management are evaluated on this basis .. Directors 
and upper-level managers often use these quantitative methods of 
judgment because of mental laziness. As economist Lester Thurow 
has noted, 
Any board of directors, no matter how inept, can hand out bonuses 
to top management based on current profits; but to know whether top 
40. See, e.g., M. GREEN & J. BERRY, supra note 11, at 80-101 (discussing how some firms 
have tamed corporate bureaucracies); T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCEL-
LENCE 171-86, 242-60 (detailing how some exceptional firms are particularly responsive to cus-
tomer needs and encourage individuality among their employees). The managers of the firms 
discussed in these sources likely do not play by the rules discussed in this section. 
41. See, e.g., R. HAYES & s. WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 18, at 7-19; P. PASCARELLA, supra 
note 18, at 163-67; R. REICH, supra note 17, at 140-45, 170-72; L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 
144-57. 
42. E.g., M. GREEN & J. BERRY, supra note 11, at 38-39; R. HAYES & s. WHEELWRIGHT, 
supra note 18, at 8-12; L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 149-57; Thompson, Kirkham & Dixon, 
Warning: The Fast Track May Be Hazardous to Organizational Health, ORGANIZATIONAL DY-
NAMICS, Spring 1985, at 21, 23-24. 
902 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:892 
management has positioned the company well for the long haul requires 
real skill. Mechanical judgments of middle-level managers based on 
earnings of their profit centers generate no controversies. Such judg-
ments favor managers who may be making good profits now but who 
should be investing to make much larger profits later, and discourage 
managers who are doing a good job in areas where the external environ-
ment makes profits difficult or impossible to obtain.43 
Professor Thurow's comment leads us directly to the second rule 
of the management game - all management decisions must show a 
profit in the short-run, with no more than two or three years as the 
outer limit.44 If a venture will not show a short-run profit, many mod-
ern American managers believe it is not worth undertaking. 
Following the first two rules, and thus engaging in a "brilliant 
piece of short-run profit maximizing," can result in a manager being 
placed on the highly desirable "fast track."45 Keeping on the "fast 
track" requires adherence to two other rules, the first of which is 
"[A]void any risks that might lead to mistakes which would knock one 
off the fast track."46 To state the rule another way, "Be risk averse in 
seeking gains for your firm."47 
The other rule for managers who wish to stay on the fast track is to 
avoid controversy or, as the common cliche runs, "Don't make 
waves."48 Under this rule, the manager whose actions generate com-
plaints and controversy is a bad manager who may be removed from 
the fast track. 
The managers who play by these rules are not the profit-maximiz-
ing automatons depicted by classical microeconomists. Instead, they 
43. L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 152. 
44. See note 42 supra . 
45. L. THUROW, supra note 17, at 151. 
46. Id.; see also Thompson, Kirkham & Dixon, supra note 42, at 24. 
47. The qualification "in seeking gains" is quite important. Psychological studies indicate 
that when it comes to avoiding what they view as certain losses, managers, like other human 
beings, are willing to accept tremendous amounts of risk. See generally, P. SCHOEMAKER, EX-
PERIMENTS ON DECISIONS UNDER RISK: THE EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS 45-90, 109-25 
(1980); Fishburn & Kochenberger, Two-Piece Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Fu11ctio11s, 10 
DECISION Sci. 503 (1979); Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: A11 Analysis of Decisio11 
U11der Risk. 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Laughhunn, Payne & Crum, Ma11agerial Risk Pref 
ere11cesfor Below-Target Returns, 26 MGT. Sci. 1238, 1247-49 (1980). But see Fagley & Miller, 
The Effects of Decision Frami11g on Choice of Risky vs. Certain Options, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 264 (1987) (empirical results suggesting that subjects 
avoid risk in situations where attempting to avoid near-certain loss). For an application of the 
findings of experimental psychology on the psychology of risk-taking to the decision of managers 
to engage in predatory pricing or to enter into a market where such pricing has been practiced, 
see Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Prici11g: Why Predatory Prici11g Pays, 39 Sw. L.J. 755 
(1985). 
48. Thompson, Kirkham & Dixon, supra note 42, at 24; see also M. GREEN & J, BERRY, 
supra note 11, at 25; T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, supra note 40, at 43. 
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tend to be risk-averse short-run profit-maximizers who are unwilling 
to "rock the boat." Such real-world managers in fact direct the affairs 
of many U.S. firms. The remainder of this article will be devoted to an 
examination of how these real-world managers are likely to behave in 
scenarios involving the antitrust laws. 
III. MANAGERIAL GAMES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
A. New Entry into Markets 
While the antitrust laws do not directly address the problem of 
firms entering new markets, the phenomenon plays a vital role in the 
contemporary interpretation of those laws. For the Chicago School, 
new entry into markets is something of a wonder drug which will, at 
least in the long run, cure any ill effects of many practices currently 
prohibited by the antitrust laws, such as unreasonable restraints of 
trade, monopolization, and anticompetitive mergers. 
Under this Chicago School view, if a cartel attempts to fix prices, 
its supracompetitive profits will attract new entrants who will under-
mine the arrangement.49 If a monopolist attempts to gouge consumers 
through monopoly-level pricing, new entrants, attracted by the high 
prices, will soon ruin the monopolist's plans.50 Similarly, new entry 
can prevent price gouging by newly merged firms even in a highly con-
centrated market.51 While the most devoted Chicago Schooler would 
not claim that the possibility of new entry should cause the antitrust 
laws to overlook price fixing among competitors, 52 most members of 
the Chicago School do insist that the possibility of new entry into mar-
kets often makes it unnecessary and inefficient to prosecute monopoli-
zation and block mergers through the antitrust laws. 53 
The rosy scenario of new entry is, of course, complicated by the 
problem of entry barriers. During the 1940s and 1950s, many anti-
trust theorists focused on what they believed to be significant "natu-
ral" barriers to market entry created by the size of existing firms and 
49. See, e.g., E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND EcONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 156, 158 
(3d ed. 1986); Hovenkamp, Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1721, 1726 (1986). 
50. See R. BORK, supra note l, at 195-96; cf Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-
strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264-65 (1981) (arguing that new entry will frustrate a monop-
olist's attempt to recoup losses caused by predatory pricing). 
51. See Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1726. 
52. See id.; R. BORK, supra note l, at 267-69. 
53. Professor Hovenkamp has noted the inconsistency between the Chicago School views 
that new entry can cure the ills inflicted by monopolists and overly concentrated markets, but 
that it cannot cure the ills inflicted by cartel members. Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1726; see 
also R. BORK, supra note I; E. GELLHORN, supra note 49. 
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the structure of the market. 54 Classical microeconomists deny that 
natural barriers to entry exist, and they maintain that the only signifi-
cant entry barriers are those created by governmental intervention. 55 
Some post-Chicago revisionists are willing to recognize strategic be-
havior by dominant firms as a source of barriers to entry.56 All three 
groups in fact overlook what may be the most important entry barrier 
in the real world - the managerial ethos of potential entrants. 
When we view the decision to enter a market from the oversimpli-
fied and unrealistic perspective of the profit-maximizing corporation 
and its robot-like managers, the decision to enter seems to be an easy 
one. If the firm can maximize its profits through new entry into a 
market, it will do so. Thus, if supracompetitive profits are being gen-
erated by a cartel, a monopoly, or firms in a highly concentrated mar-
ket, new profit-maximizing entrants will come marching in, lured by 
the high profit levels, and quickly bring profits and prices down to 
competitive levels. s7 
However, when new entry is viewed from the manager's perspec-
tive, it looks far less probable. The first problem is the time frame of 
any payoff resulting from a decision to enter. New entry into virtually 
any market, including one characterized by monopoly or cartelized 
high prices, is likely to result in a short-run diminution of profits or 
even in losses, as the new entrant becomes familiar with a new field or 
gets up to speed on the "learning curve" in a new industry.58 Indeed, 
a profit may not be turned for several years. Thus, new entry may 
violate one of the prime rules for modern managerial success - that 
new ventures must show a short-run profit.59 The manager making 
the decision to enter may be reluctant to enter because she may be 
blamed for any short-run losses, and she may not be credited for long-
run profits ultimately resulting from entry because she may not even 
be with the same employer if and when the new venture begins to 
show a profit. 
54. The pioneering work making this point was J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 
(1956). 
55. See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 310-29; Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, 
in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164, 181-84 (H. Goldschmid, H. 
Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974). 
56. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 260-83; see also Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive 
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) (discuss-
ing how even nonmonopolists can use strategic behavior to exclude competitors from markets by 
forcing them to raise prices). 
57. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 1, at 195-96; E. GELLHORN, supra note 49, at 156-58; 
Hovenkamp, supra note 49. 
58. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 250-51. 
59. See text at note 44 supra. 
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The second problem with new entry from a manager's perspective 
is that the process almost always entails risks. 60 The risks are espe-
cially grave if entry is to be made in a field in which the firm has little 
or no experience.61 As noted previously, risk is something contempo-
rary American managers eschew, especially if those managers are on 
the "fast track."62 New entry into a market is precisely the type of 
risky decision which many contemporary American managers would 
prefer not to make. Moreover, the managers' fear of market entry can 
be heightened by strategic behavior on the part of firms already in the 
market.63 
Take, for example, the case of a decision to enter a market domi-
60. See c. SUTION, EcONOMICS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 82-83 (1980); Porter, How 
Competitive Forces Shape Strategy, in STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 37-39 (R. Hamermesh ed. 
1983). 
61. See T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, supra note 40, at 292-305. 
62. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text. To sound a recurrent theme of this article, 
a decision not to take the risk of entering a market may not be -the product of a conscious 
decision by a manager to put her career ahead of the welfare of her firm; rather, it may result 
from miscalculation as to the best course of action for the firm. The profitability of entering a 
new market will depend not only on the actions of the potential entrant and of the existing firms 
in the market, but on the actions of other potential entrants as well. As economist Shlomo 
Maital and psychologist Sharone Maital have pointed out, many large companies are run by 
executives less eager to make big profits than to avoid large losses. S. MAITAL & S. MAITAL, 
ECONOMIC GAMES PEOPLE PLAY 88 (1984). Maital and Maital point out that such executives 
tend to view a decision on whether to invest in research and development of a new product as a 





















AFfER YOU, GAR(,;ON 
In the game of"After You, Gar~on," farge profits are garnered by the firm which lets others take 
the risks, and then moves in to take the "gravy." Id. at 87. The game can easily be applied to a 
decision on whether to enter a new market. If executives view the decision to enter as a game of 
"After You, Gar~n," they are apt not to enter the market. As Maital and Maital point out, 
cautious managers, focused on quarterly profit-and-loss statements, are indeed likely to view 
market-entry decisions as games of "After You, Gar~on" even when they are not forms of this 
game. Id. at 89. Thus, these managers are likely to avoid entry because they believe it is not in 
the best interests of their firm. 
63. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 260-83; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 56, at 230-
48. 
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nated by a monopolist charging monopoly-level prices and reaping 
monopolistic profits. The monopolist can increase the level of per-
ceived risk among the managers of potential entrants by utilizing a 
variety of tactics such as cutting off the entrant from low-cost sources 
of supply, 64 creating product differentiation and strong brand identifi-
cation through massive advertising, 65 committing business torts or un-
fair business practices, 66 instituting harassing litigation, 67 or 
attempting to secure legislation unfavorable to new entrants. 6s 
Whether any of these tactics can succeed in the long run is irrelevant. 
Predatory behavior, as long as it increases perceived risk among the 
managers of potential entrants or decreases the short-run profitability 
of actual or potential rivals, will frustrate new entry by playing on the 
tendencies of American managers to avoid taking risks and to look 
almost exclusively at short-term profits.69 
An amusing and enlightening example of how a firm can eliminate 
64. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 56, at 234-36. 
65. See Porter, supra note 60, at 38. 
66. See B. KELLMAN, PRIVATE ANTITRUST LmGATION 129-30 (1985). 
67. See R. BORK, supra note l, at 347-49. 
68. Id. 
69. Contrary to the assumptions of Chicago School analysis, predatory behavior need not be 
either ultimately successful or sustainable on a long-term basis in order to deter market entry. 
Chicago School analysis is premised on the notion that predatory conduct will not avail a firm 
seeking to deter or repel entry if the conduct will cost the predator more in the long run than it 
costs the victim. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 10 (discussing unlikelihood of predatory pric-
ing strategies being utilized or successful); Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and 
Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1052 (1986) (same). Robert Bork argues that, 
in order to engage in nongovernmental predation, a firm must be able to impose larger costs on 
its victim than on itself and must have greater reserves or better access to capital than the victim. 
See R. BORK, supra note l, at 348. 
The analysis put forth by Bork and his fellow Chicagoans fails to comprehend that, in the real 
world of late twentieth-century American managerialism, the ability of predatory tactics to suc-
ceed in the long run is largely irrelevant. Given managers' short-term profit orientation and 
unwillingness to take risks, any predatory tactic which diminishes a new entrant's short-run 
profit or significantly increases the riskiness of its new venture is likely to make managers ex-
tremely hesitant to proceed with new entry, regardless of the long-term prospects of the new 
entrant or the predator. The success of the tiny maker of Formula 409 in driving giant Proctor 
and Gamble from the spray-cleaner market is illustrative of this point. See notes 70-71 infra and 
accompanying text. 
Of course, the predator will often incur short-run losses in carrying out its predatory strategy. 
The obvious question arises of why the management of the predator is williiJg to incur short-term 
losses in search of long-term gain while the management of the new entrant is unwilling to make 
such a trade off. The answer to this seeming paradox is that the managers of the predator and 
new entrant are in quite different positions. The managers of the new entrant are in search of 
gains. The managers of the predator are trying to avoid what they probably view as a certain loss 
of their competitive position. Psychological evidence suggests that the managers of the predators 
are apt to be risk affinitive in seeking to avoid losses while the managers of the new entrant are 
likely to be risk averse in seeking gains. See Gerla, supra note 47, at 761-62, 768-70. Even con-
ventional microeconomics recognizes that persons may place a higher price on not being de-
prived of a good than on acquiring the good in the first place. Cj E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS, 134-37 (1976) (discussing microeconomic concepts of "compensation value" and 
"equivalence value"). Thus, the managers of the predator may well be more willing to take 
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a rival from a market by taking advantage of the psychological predis-
positions of the rival's managers is the manner in which the maker of 
"Formula 409" drove Proctor and Gamble (P & G) out of the spray-
cleaner market. 7° Formula 409 was made by a small manufacturer, 
Wilson Harrell. Harrell learned that P & G, the nation's largest man-
ufacturer of laundry products, wished to introduce a new spray 
cleaner called "Cinch." Harrell also learned that P & G had decided 
to use Denver as a test market for the new cleaner. When P & G 
began test marketing Cinch in Denver, Harrell deliberately inflated P 
& G's expectations for Cinch by subtly pulling Formula 409 from the 
Denver market. When Cinch began to be marketed nationally, Har-
rell offered deep discounts on Formula 409 which encouraged consum-
ers to buy six-month supplies of the product. Sales of Cinch were 
extremely poor because consumers already had more spray cleaner 
than they could possibly use. In light of Cinch's spectacular debut in 
Denver, the managers of P & G were especially discouraged by the 
product's poor national sales. P & G withdrew Cinch from the market 
within a year of its introduction. In the theoretical world of classical 
microeconomics, Wilson Harrell could not have bested P & G. A 
small manufacturer could not sustain the deep discounts on its prod-
uct when its gigantic rival had the capacity to absorb huge losses. 
Nevertheless, in the real world, Wilson Harrell was able to oust P & G 
from the spray-cleaner market by taking advantage of the risk aversion 
and inflated expectations of the P & G managers.71 
The reluctance of real-world managers to bring their firms into 
new markets has a number of important implications for antitrust law 
and policy. First, new entry cannot be relied upon to destroy cartels 
and eliminate consumer harm caused by horizontal price-fixing or ter-
ritorial division. Thus, vigorous antitrust enforcement against such 
arrangements is still justifiable. 72 Second, new entry cannot be relied 
greater risks and incur short-term losses in their effort to preserve the predator's market position 
than will the managers of the new entrant in their effort to enhance their firm's market position. 
70. See P. SOLMAN & T. FRIEDMAN, LIFE AND DEATH ON THE CORPORATE BATILEFIELD 
25-26 (1982). 
71. As Solman and Friedman put it, "It was a close shave for Wilson Harrell .... But 
Harrell knew the psychology of big companies." Id. In the theoretical world of profit-maximiz-
ing managers, the psychology of those in charge of firms should be irrelevant in determining 
behavior. In the real world of real businesses, the psychology of those in charge plays a large role 
in determining how "firms" will actually behave. 
72. Not even the most devoted members of the Chicago School would subscribe to the propo-
sition that barring cartelization is unnecessary because new entry will foil attempts to charge 
supracompetitive prices. As Professor Hovenkamp notes, the Chicago School's advocacy of con-
tinued antitrust enforcement against cartelization is inconsistent with their belief in the insignifi-
cance of entry barriers. Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1726. But see D. ARMENTANO, 
ANTITRUsr POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 64-65 (1986) (explicitly arguing that antitrust 
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upon to spoil attempts by monopolists or oligopolists to reap 
supracompetitive profits. Therefore, the theoretical ease of entry or 
the mere possibility of entry should not rule out enforcement action 
against monopolies or mergers which unduly increase market 
concentration. 73 
That antitrust enforcement authorities or courts might fall into the 
trap of assuming that the theoretical ease of entry is equivalent to en-
try in fact is more than just speculation. Both the 1982 and 1984 De-
partment of Justice Merger Guidelines rely heavily on theoretical entry 
barriers in determining whether a merger should be challenged under 
the antitrust laws. 74 
The other federal antitrust enforcement agency, the Federal Trade 
Commission, has also succumbed to the temptation to equate theoreti-
cal ease of market entry with actual entry. In In re Echlin Manufac-
turing, 75 the Commission dismissed a staff complaint against a merger 
in the carburetor-kit-production industry between competitors with 
thirty-six percent and ten percent of a small, declining, highly concen-
trated market (six firms accounted for ninety-five percent of sales).76 
The primary basis for the Commission's dismissal of the staff com-
plaint was its finding that, under a narrow definition of entry barriers, 
such barriers were not a significant factor in the relevant market.77 
The Commission made its findings on the ease of market entry in the 
face of evidence that "the recent record of new entrants is especially 
prohibition against cartels is unnecessary because new entry will frustrate the achievement of 
cartel objectives). 
73. While the implications of the "entry is easy" thesis have not slackened the hostility of 
commentators to cartel-like behavior, they have "inspired many people - Chicago School as 
well as others - to become more tolerant of mergers." Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1726 
(footnote omitted). In light of the reluctance of real-world managers to take risks and to forego 
profits for extended periods, that tolerance may well be undeserved. 
74. Both the 1984 and 1982 merger guidelines use "ease of entry" as a key determinant in the 
decision to challenge a merger as anticompetitive. U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines, re-
printed in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 4493.30 (1984); U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines, 
reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 4503.20 (1982). Those actually charged with the anti-
trust enforcement at the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice may, in practice, not 
rely as heavily on the theoretical ease of entry as the Merger Guidelines would suggest. At an 
antitrust conference, then-Deputy Attorney General Mark Leddy stated that in determining 
whether to challenge a merger, the Antitrust Division looked at more than the theoretical ease of 
entry into the market: "The pertinent question is how likely entry is." Leddy, Entry Issues ill 
Merger Analysis, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1257, 1258 (1986) (emphasis in original). In response to a 
questioner who pointed out that likelihood of entry might be different from ease of entry, Leddy 
went on to say that in determining the likelihood of entry, the Division looked first to the actual 
past history of entry into the market. Yoerg, Hill & Leddy, Panel Disc11ssio11, 54 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 1271, 1271-72 (1986). This article also favors the approach of relying on the actual history 
of market entry. See note 83 infra and accompanying text. 
75. 105 F.T.C. 410 (1985). 
76. 105 F.T.C. at 492 (Bailey, Commr., dissenting). 
77. See 105 F.T.C. at 487. 
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poor in [the carburetor-kit] industry, and . . at least one case of 
targeted market retaliation by the market leader against a new firm 
[has occurred]."78 In effect, when the Commission was faced with a 
choice between reality and theory, it chose the latter. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made a 
similar error in its decision in United States v. Waste Management, 
Inc. 79 Here the Second Circuit held that theoretical ease of entry into 
the solid waste disposal market allowed a defendant to rebut success-
fully a presumption of anticompetitive effect created by the merger of 
two firms with a combined 48.8% market share.80 The judges on the 
panel that decided Waste Management (as well as those at the Federal 
Trade Commission and the drafters of the 1982 and 1984 Justice De-
partment Merger Guidelines) erroneously equated the existence of low 
entry barriers with the actual entry of new firms into a market. In the 
theoretical world of profit-maximizing firms, the equation is under-
standable. 81 In the real world of contemporary American business 
management, the equation is untenable. 
Of course, merely because modem American managers are loathe 
to enter new markets does not mean that such entry is nonexistent. 
There are too many examples of firms entering markets against seem-
ingly hopeless odds to claim that entry into new markets is illusory. 82 
However, the reticence of American executives to take risks or to look 
beyond relatively short time horizons does suggest that the mere possi-
bility of entry should not be determinative in gauging the long-term 
effects of mergers or of persistently large market-share concentrations. 
To judge accurately the effects of new entry or potential new entry on 
the ability of a monopolist or near-monopolist to reap supracompeti-
tive profits in the long term, courts or enforcement authorities should 
look to actual successful entry into the market rather than the pres-
ence or absence of theoretical entry barriers. 83 
78. 105 F.T.C. at 498 (Bailey, Commr., dissenting). 
79. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984). 
80. 743 F.2d at 982-83. The court's conclusion in Waste Management was somewhat more 
defensible than the FTC's conclusion in Echlin, given that some successful entry into the market 
in Waste Management had in fact occurred. 743 F.2d at 982-83. However, this limited success-
ful market entry cannot justify the conclusion either that entry was easy, or more importantly, 
that from the perspective of the managers of a potential entrant, entry was a relatively risk-free 
proposition. As the court itself noted, most of the new entrants in the market were no longer in 
existence at the time of suit. 743 F.2d at 982. For critiques of the Waste Management decision, 
see p. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LA w ~ 917 .1 b, at 668 (Supp. 1987); and Lipner, 
Horizontal Mergers, General Dynamics and Its Progeny: Requiem for a Presumption, 27 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 381, 397-99 (1986). 
81. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 
82. See, e.g., P. SOLMAN & T. FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 19-20, 34-35. 
83. Of course, the concept that actual successful entry is the best evidence that new entry 
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B. Exclusionary Practices Aimed at Competitors 
The antitrust laws do not automatically forbid efforts to drive com-
petitors from the market. Indeed, excluding competitors from the 
market through competition on the merits is part of what the antitrust 
laws are supposed to encourage. 84 On the other hand, use of certain 
tactics to oust competitors from the market does run afoul of the anti-
trust laws. 85 One of these tactics is the classic group boycott. . Profes-
sor Lawrence Sullivan defines the classic group boycott as an effort 
"by traders at one level to keep others out or inhibit their competitive 
efforts at that level by making it more difficult for them to find what 
traders at that level need, usually suppliers or customers."86 Certain 
classic group boycotts are per se violations of the antitrust laws. 87 
Thus, if a group of dealers pressures a common supplier to cut off a 
rival dealer from a necessary resource, they may well be committing a 
per se violation of the antitrust laws. 88 For example, in United States 
v. General Motors Corp., the Supreme Court held that an attempt by 
Los Angeles-area General Motors dealers to defeat rival discounters 
by inducing General Motors to cut off the discounters constituted a 
per se illegal group boycott. 89 
One of the problems with evaluating classic group boycotts under 
the antitrust laws is that they are difficult to distinguish from cases in 
which a supplier for non-price-related reasons of its own decides to cut 
off a distributor.90 A distinction between the two situations is crucial 
for two reasons. First, in cases involving the latter pattern, the defen-
dant's conduct is evaluated under a rule-of-reason analysis, if not 
given de facto, per se, legal status.91 Second, if the supplier's decision 
into a market is likely did not originate with this article and does not depend on the acceptance 
of a micro-microeconomic approach to antitrust law. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI· 
TRUST LAW 1] 917c, at 88 (1980); see also Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 498 (Bailey, Commr., dissenting); 
Yoerg, Hill & Leddy, supra note 74, at 1272 (indicating that the Antitrust Division of the Justice 
Department in practice relies heavily on historical patterns of entry in assessing the likelihood of 
new entry). A focus on managers as the key actors in antitrust law does, however, strengthen the 
importance of a demonstrated history of successful entry. Once a firm has successfully entered 
the market, riskiness of entry as perceived by managers of other would-be entrants is probably 
decreased. Aside from a herd instinct pushing managers toward the now tried-and-true path, the 
managers may subscribe to the maxim that "what one fool can do, so can another." 
84. See, e.g., B. KELLMAN, supra note 66, at 41. 
85. See id. at 41-42. 
86. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 232 (1977), 
87. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 293-94 (1985). 
88. See, e.g., B. KELLMAN, supra note 66, at 51-52. 
89. 384 U.S. 127, 146-48 (1966). 
90. See Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should Make Cases, 12 
J. CORP. L. 1, 25-26 (1986). 
91. Compare Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919 
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is truly unilateral, its conduct lies outside the scope of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, which prohibits only concerted actions.92 
In light of classical microeconomic theory, many present day anti-
trust suits involving claims by plaintiffs that competitors on the same 
level of distribution have pressured powerful suppliers to cut off the 
plaintiffs from goods or other items needed for continuance of their 
businesses93 seem somewhat incredible. As Tyler Baker put it: 
In general, it would be unlikely that an individual dealer could force a 
manufacturer to take action against its own interest .... It [also] seems 
relatively unlikely that even coordinated dealer pressure in one regional 
market could force a firm to make a nationwide policy decision with 
which it fundamentally disagreed.94 
If Matsushita is taken to its logical extreme, many of these anti-
trust suits should be dismissed on motion for summary judgment be-
cause they are microeconomically implausible.95 Indeed, some 
commentators have questioned the result in General Motors itself on 
the ground that the government's claim in that case was dubious as a 
matter of microeconomic theory.96 
In General Motors, the vehicle through which GM sought to disci-
pline dealers who engaged in discounting was the location clause in 
the dealership franchise agreement.97 This clause required GM deal-
(2d Cir. 1985) (upholding a distributor termination made because distributor was not properly 
displaying supplier's wares) and A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 
1981) (upholding distributor termination by supplier who wanted to implement system of exclu-
sive distributorships), with Service Merchandise Co. v. Boyd Corp., 722 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1983) 
and Corn-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding liability in cases 
where distributor termination motivated by pressure from coalition of terminated distributor's 
competitors). 
Some courts and commentators have questioned whether the distinction between classic 
group boycotts, and dealer-initiated nonprice terminations, is feasible or meaningful. See, e.g., 
Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 
107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 744 (7th 
Cir. 1982); Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Laby-
rinth: Is Sylvania A Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REv. 1457, 1488-93 (1981); Liebeler, Intrabrand "Car-
tels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1982). Nonetheless, controlling 
Supreme Court precedent requires that the distinction be made. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977) (although vertical nonprice restraints are to 
receive rule-of-reason treatment, horizontal restrictions "originating in agreements among retail-
ers" remain per se illegal) (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)). 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Garment Dist., Inc. v. 
Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1986); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, 
Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1985), ajfd., 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986). 
93. E.g., Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1986); 
National Marine Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190, 191-92 (4th Cir. 1985); 
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 921-22 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
94. Baker, supra note 91, at 1507-08. 
95. See text at notes 4-8 supra. 
96. Baker, supra note 91, at 1501-04; Liebeler, supra note 91, at 31-36. 
97. 384 U.S. 127, 139 (1966). 
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ers to sell only at the location specified in their contract.98 If GM, in 
cutting off discounting dealers, was merely attempting to enforce its 
own vertical territorial restraints, as opposed to bowing to pressure 
from a coalition of its dealers, that action would today either get rule-
of-reason treatment (under the law as enunciated by the Court in Con-
tinental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 99) or, perhaps more likely, be 
held to be totally outside the ambit of section 1 of the Sherman Act 
because such action was "unilateral" on the part of GM. 100 
The spectacle of a group of automobile dealers forcing one of the 
United States' largest corporations to adopt a policy which ran con-
trary to its own interests does seem to be economically farfetched. In 
fact, the claim seems so farfetched from a classical microeconomic 
perspective that if the government were to bring a similar action to-
day, it might be subject to dismissal on motion for summary judgment 
under Matsushita. According to some microeconomic theorists, GM 
had no interest in preventing sales by discounters because the firm 
wanted to increase total sales. 101 Thus, the only reason GM cut its 
own revenues by enforcing the location clauses against the discounters 
was to increase its long-term profitability by protecting its franchise 
system from disruption by free-riding discounters.102 
Similar reasoning can be used to reject many contemporary claims 
involving pressure by rival distributional outlets on mutual suppliers. 
For example, take the typical scenario in which an established, tradi-
tional, full-price retail outlet allegedly pressures a supplier to cut off a 
rival discounter by threatening to withdraw its business from the sup-
plier.103 Under microeconomic theory, the supplier faced with a 
choice between the two outlets will pick the one which maximizes its 
profits. In theory, that should be the discounter, given its higher sales 
volume.104 If the supplier chooses the traditional retailer, it must be 
because using that outlet somehow provides a more efficient means of 
distributing the supplier's goods. The efficiencies most often alleged 
by modem microeconomists are the prevention of free riding by dis-
98. 384 U.S. at 139. 
99. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
100. See note 92 supra. 
101. Liebeler, supra note 91, at 32. 
102. See Baker, supra note 91, at 1502; Liebeler, supra note 91, at 32-33; Posner, The Rule of 
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
7 (1977). 
103. See note 93 supra. 
104. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 49, at 284 (manufacturer's interest is in having its sellers 
sell more of its product, so long as the wholesale price the manufacturer receives does not drop); 
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 147 (1984) 
(manufacturers desire the lowest possible retail price to sell more units). 
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count outlets, the validation function of more prestigious outlets, or 
the rental of desirable shelf space by the supplier. 105 It follows inexo-
rably from this chain of reasoning that if the supplier chooses to cut off 
the discounter, it does so to enhance its efficiency in distributing its 
products, and the supplier's decision, as a vertical territorial restraint, 
should be reviewed under a rule-of-reason analysis (if it is not per se 
legal under the antitrust laws106) or be exempt from scrutiny under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act because of a lack of concerted action. 107 
The problem with the microeconomists' neat scenario, in which 
suppliers (be they contemporary suppliers of discounters or GM in the 
1950s and 1960s) are merely enforcing their own contractual rights in 
their own best interests, is that the scenario contains a fundamentally 
erroneous assumption: that the outlets are pressuring "the suppliers." 
A decision by a supplier to cut off or restrain a customer is not made 
by "the supplier," but by the human managers of the supplier. When 
we view that decision in light of the interests and behavior of those 
managers, a rather different outcome than that posited by classical 
microeconomists may in fact occur. 
A reexamination of the situation in which traditional, full-price re-
tail outlets pressure the managers of a powerful mutual supplier to 
stop selling to rival discounters demonstrates the differences between 
theoretical profit-maximizing firms and real-world firms run by human 
managers. While continued dealings with the discounters may be in 
the long-term interests of a supplier from a profit-maximizing perspec-
tive, such a course of action may not be in the interests of the sup-
plier's managers. First, ifthe traditional retailers stop dealing with the 
supplier, the supplier's short-run sales and profits may decline. 108 Of 
course, this short-run decline may eventually be more than offset by 
increased sales through the discounters. 109 Unfortunately, such a 
105. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note I, at 435; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 253-58 
(emphasizing the free rider problem); Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and 
the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 736 (1984) (emphasizing the shelf space 
and validation functions of vertical restraints). 
106. See Baker, supra note 91, at 1467-68; Phillips & Mahoney, Unreasonable Rules and 
Rules of Reason: Economic Aspects of Vertical Price-Fixing, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 99 (1985) 
(arguing for rule-of-reason treatment for vertical restraints); Posner, The Next Step in the Anti-
trust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8 (1981) (argu-
ing for per se legality for vertical restraints); see also Liebeler, supra note 91 (arguing for per se 
legal treatment of all restraints imposed within same brand). 
107. See note 92 supra. 
108. See Steiner, The Nature of Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 162 (1985) 
(alternate channels of distribution may not have reached a "critical mass size" large enough to 
make up for traditional retailers who refuse to carry a supplier's wares). 
109. Discounters tend to be high-volume outlets. See E. CUNDIFF, R. STILL & N. GOVONI, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN MARKETING 222 (4th ed. 1985); C. SCHEWE & R. SMITH, MAR-
KETING: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 419 (2d ed. 1983). 
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turnaround may take some time. As we have seen, contemporary 
American managers tend to look almost exclusively to the short 
run. 110 Thus, the short-run diminution in profits caused by the loss of 
the traditional retailers' business may unjustifiably outweigh the long-
run increase in profits that could be garnered through continued sales 
to the discounters. Second, by not remedying the traditional retailers' 
complaints, the managers may be violating a commandment of mod-
ern American management practice: "[T]hou shalt not make 
waves." 111 The complaints by long-time customers cannot reflect well 
on the managers' ability to keep things running smoothly. Of course, 
the discounters will complain to the suppliers if they are cut off; how-
ever, their complaints may not create the same level of dissatisfaction 
as the complaints of traditional retailers. First, the traditional retailers 
may have the advantage of numbers. 112 Thus, they can generate a 
larger volume of complaints than the discounters. Second, and more 
importantly, the conventional retailers may have been dealing with the 
supplier for a longer time than the discounters. The longer course of 
dealing can give the traditional retailers superior personal contacts 
among the supplier's management. 113 These superior contacts can re-
sult in the traditional retailers' complaints being seen as generating 
more of a "problem" than the discounters' complaints. In sum, if the 
managers follow their own rules of the game rather than act as profit-
maximizing robots, they may well succumb to the pressure of buyers 
without market power even if such a capitulation is not in the best 
interests of their employer. 
The possibility of management capitulating to further their per-
sonal interests exists even in the case of a firm as large and powerful as 
GM. The nondiscounting dealers in General Motors probably did not 
have a feasible means of switching their franchises to another 
automaker. Therefore, they probably could not pressure GM's man-
agement by creating a short-run reduction in sales of Chevrolets. The 
dealers did, however, possess a credible threat of making the GM offi-
cials responsible for dealer relations appear to be making great 
"waves" within the company. In fact, the Los Angeles Chevrolet 
Dealers Association "flood[ed] General Motors and the Chevrolet Di-
vision with letters and telegrams asking for help" in stopping discount-
110. See text at note 44 supra. 
111. See text at note 48 supra. 
112. Historically, traditional retailers have used their large numbers to combat innovative 
retail competitors. See J. PALAMOUNTAlN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 4445 (1955). 
113. See generally R. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE 173-84 (1984) (detailing psychological evidence 
establishing that persons are more trusting of those with whom they are familiar). 
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ing. 114 The arrival of a flood of complaining letters and telegrams 
from dealers did not instill confidence in the superiors of those manag-
ers charged with dealer relations. A cutoff of discounters through en-
forcement of the locations clauses was not likely to generate the same 
amount of controversy within the company because the outlets dealing 
with the discounters were vastly outnumbered by the ordinary auto-
mobile dealers. 115 The managers of GM may have yielded to dealer 
pressure not to advance the long-term interests of the automaker, but 
to advance the short-term management objective of not being seen as 
"making waves" within the company.116 
Focusing on managers rather than on profit-maximizing firms as 
key economic actors does not necessarily mean that the actions of GM 
in the early 1960s, or the actions of contemporary firms which have 
stopped dealing with discounters after complaints by traditional retail-
ers, were the product of self-interested decisions by the firms' manag-
ers. What a micro-microeconomic approach does suggest is that a 
competitor can, by taking advantage of the modem style of American 
management, induce a much larger supplier to terminate the competi-
tor's rival even though such a termination is not in the best long-run 
interests of the supplier. This micro-microeconomic insight has a 
number of significant implications for contemporary antitrust law. 
First, we should reject the claim made by some commentators (and 
uncritically accepted by at least one United States Court of Appeals) 
that no meaningful difference exists between a distributional restraint 
unilaterally imposed by a supplier and a termination foisted upon the 
supplier by any of its outlets which lack market power.117 Perhaps in 
the theoretical world of microeconomics no supplier will bow to pres-
114. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 134 (1966). 
115. Of the 85 Chevrolet dealers in the Los Angeles area, only a dozen were selling through 
discounters. 384 U.S. at 132. 
116. By not immediately terminating the dealers supplying discounters, the Chevrolet zone 
manager for Los Angeles was certainly "making waves" within GM. Within a week of the re-
ceipt of the flood of telegrams, this manager's superiors in Detroit ordered him to furnish "a 
detailed report of the discount house operations ... as well as what action we in the Zone are 
taking to curb such sales." 384 U.S. at 134. 
At the time the events described in the case took place, GM placed a particularly heavy 
emphasis on its managers acting as "team players." One observer described the atmosphere at 
GM as follows: 
Those pledges willing to obey the rules were promoted. In the vernacular, they were the 
company's "team players." Those who didn't fit into the mold ... who didn't adhere to the 
rules ... generally weren't promoted. "He's not a team player," was the frequent, and many 
times only, objection to an executive in line for promotion. It didn't mean he was doing a 
poor job. It meant ... [h]e rocked the boat 
J. WRIGHT, ON A CLEAR DAY You CAN SEE GENERAL MOTORS 40 (1979) (emphasis added). 
117. For claims that no meaningful distinction exists, see Liebeler, supra note 91, at 8-13. 
See also Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(Posner, J.) (dictum). This view was recently accepted by the United States Court of Appeals for 
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sure from one of its outlets without market power. Under this view, 
any restriction the supplier adopts in response to pressure from its out-
lets would have been adopted even without that pressure. In the real 
world of American firms, however, human managers may bow to such 
pressure to further their personal interests. We should not automati-
cally assume that the true impetus for such a restriction stemmed from 
the supplier rather than from the outlets. 
Second, claims that suppliers ceased to deal with discounters at the 
behest of rivals should not be dismissed out-of-hand merely because 
the coalition of rivals seems to lack market power. 118 A micro-
microeconomic approach to antitrust law demonstrates that even firms 
without market power can damage rivals and reduce competition by 
taking advantage of the tendencies of American management to look 
to short-run profits and to avoid causing internal corporate friction. 
Third, vertical restraints which currently receive rule-of-reason 
treatment should be examined carefully to see if the restraints are truly 
vertical rather than horizontal restraints foisted on the supplier by an 
outlet or a coalition of outlets. One of the justifications for according 
territorial vertical restraints rule-of-reason treatment is that the sup-
plier imposing the restraint lacks the anticompetitive motive that com-
petitors would possess had they imposed the very same restraint. 119 
One of the traditional counters to this justification is that the restraint 
may in fact be the product of a horizontal dealer cartel rather than of 
the supplier's independent judgment.120 A focus on the managers of 
suppliers as the key actors in antitrust scenarios strongly supports this 
traditional counter by demonstrating how suppliers can be coerced 
into applying "vertical" restraints much more easily than static 
microeconomic models would predict. The ease with which outlets 
can in fact coerce suppliers into imposing restraints justifies a careful 
look into whether an apparent vertical restraint is truly vertical or is 
instead ·a horizontal restraint clothed in the garb of a vertical 
restraint. 121 
the Fourth Circuit. Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
118. For an argument that coalitions of distributors which lack market power are unlikely to 
force a supplier to adopt policies contrary to its self-interest, see Baker, supra note 91, at 1507-08. 
For a more general argument that proof of any antitrust violation ought to require that the 
defendant possess market power, see Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. I, 
19-23 (1984). 
119. E.g., R. BORK, supra note 1, at 290. 
120. E.g .• H: HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 248-49. 
121. That distributors are able to coerce managers of suppliers to impose "vertical" re-
straints, even when those restraints may not be in the best long-term interests of the supplier, is 
supported by observations of two former antitrust-enforcement officials that many so-called vcrti-
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C. Collusion Among Competitors 
Price-fixing arrangements and market allocations among competi-
tors have long been subject to per se condemnation under the antitrust 
laws. 122 The vast majority of commentators, from populist to Chicago 
School devotee, agree with the out-of-hand condemnation of both 
practices, especially when such practices have no legitimate enterprise 
to which they are ancillary. 123 Classical microeconomics does not sug-
gest that price fixing and market allocations are beneficial to consum-
ers. Indeed, classical microeconomic analysis suggests that cartels 
engaging in those practices are apt to cause a net social-welfare loss. 124 
Classical microeconomics also suggests, however, that the harm 
caused by such arrangements may be more minimal or short-lived 
than might be supposed given the harsh treatment of the practices 
under the antitrust laws. " 
Microeconomists point out that cartels are extremely fragile. Two 
phenomena, market entry and cheating, eventually tend to undermine 
cartels. As a cartel begins to reap supracompetitive profits, the high 
prices charged by its members will lure other firms into the market. 125 
The members of the cartel can, of course, attempt to co-opt the new 
entrants by having them join the cartel. Such a course, however, 
plants the seeds for the cartel's demise. First, the larger the number of 
participants in the cartel, the greater the problems of coordination and 
enforcement of cartel agreements. 126 Second, the larger the number of 
participants in the cartel, the greater the likelihood that at least one of 
the participants will begin to engage in the activity which will eventu-
ally bring down the arrangement - cheating on the terms of the cartel 
cal restraints are in reality horizontal restraints imposed by distributor cartels. See Litvack, The 
Future Viability of the Current Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 955, 
957 (1987) ("[M]ost resale price maintenance schemes are hatched, nurtured, or preserved by the 
retailers in a cartel-like manner. That is the reality."); Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next JOO Year.s, 
75 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 831 (1987) ("In most instances, vertical price fixing is adopted to placate 
powerful groups of distributors who induce suppliers to assist dealer cartels .... "). 
122. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (condemning hori-
zontal price-fixing as per se illegal); United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) 
(condemning horizontal market divisions as per se illegal). 
123. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note l, at 267 (price-fixing and market-division agreements 
which have no legitimate ancillary justification should be subject to per se condemnation); L. 
SULLIVAN, supra note 86, at 203-04, 224-29 (commentator with populist leanings arguing that 
price-fixing and market-division conspiracies should be per se illegal). But see Easterbrook, supra 
note 118 (even restraints of trade having no procompetitive justification should not be con-
demned under the antitrust laws if the firms imposing them lack market power). 
124. See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 263-64; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 83-84. 
125. F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 173. 
126. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 90-91. 
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agreement.127 
A participant in a cartel has a tremendous incentive to cheat on the 
arrangement - the prospect of huge profits. A cartel member, by 
secretly charging a lower (but still profit-making) price while its fellow 
members charge the cartel price, can increase sales volumes and prof-
its.12s The fragility is even greater where the cartel arrangement is a 
somewhat loose one that allows some sales by participants outside the 
bounds of the cartel arrangement.129 In effect, such an arrangement 
allows official cheating on the cartel. Microeconomists tell us that 
cheating will eventually cause all cartels to dissolve. 130 
Finally, microeconomists suggest that firms lacking market power 
(or its traditional surrogate, market share) cannot form an effectual 
cartel.131 If, for example, two small firms attempt to raise prices by 
cutting their output, the noncartel members will simply raise their out-
put.132 The net result will be that prices and total output will remain 
stable, and the two cartel members will lose market share, having cut 
their own throats.133 Thus, for example, the only likely result of a 
price-fixing cartel between two small grocery stores in an area served 
by numerous grocery outlets is to ensure the demise of the two price-
fixing grocery stores. 
A micro-microeconomic approach to antitrust law does not neces-
sarily indicate that the conclusions drawn through classical 
microeconomic analysis are incorrect. However, a focus on managers 
as key actors rather than on firms does indicate the following: (1) 
Cartels are much more stable than classical microeconomics would 
predict; (2) Managers frequently will not seize even highly profitable 
opportunities to cheat on a cartel, whether those opportunities need to 
be taken in secret or can be grasped openly; (3) The co-optation of a 
new entrant into the cartel is much easier than one would suppose; 
and (4) Price-fixing or market-division cartels can diminish competi-
127. See c. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 359-60 (3d ed. 1972); J. HIRSHLEIFER, 
PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 261-62 (3d ed. 1984); F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 171. 
128. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 127, at 261-62; H. HoVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 83-
85; F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 172-73. 
129. Classical microeconomics questions the concept of a "loose" cartel in which the partici-
pants are allowed to engage in transactions outside the bounds of the cartel. Cf. H. 
HovENKAMP, supra note 14, at 134 ("[N)o cartel could restrict its output and raise price if it 
permitted its members freely to come and go, or to make unlimited 'non-cartel' sales."). 
130. See note 127 supra; see a/so W. SHEPHERD & C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD 
BUSINESS 196 (6th ed. 1979). 
131. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 118, at 20. 
132. See id. 
133. Id. 
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tion and have adverse economic effects even where the members of the 
cartels collectively lack market power. 
As discussed, cheating on a cartel makes eminent sense from the 
perspective of a profit-maximizing firm. 134 From the perspective of 
the managers of the firm, the decision whether to cheat on the cartel 
arrangements may not be so simple. Cheating on a cartel does create 
the opportunity for large short-run profits, and, as noted, modern 
American managers highly value short-run profits. 135 Thus, a concord 
of interest between the profit-maximizing firm and its human manag-
ers would seem to exist, and cheating on cartels would seem to be a 
frequent and predictable occurrence. However, a more careful exami-
nation of the motivation of the managers of members or putative 
members of a cartel indicates that from the perspective of those man-
agers, the case for cheating is not clear-cut. 
Cheating on the cartel arrangement involves a large degree of risk. 
If the cheating is detected, full-scale competition may erupt. Full-
scale competition will, of course, diminish profitability.136 In the eyes 
of managers contemplating cartel cheating, the risk of such competi-
tion may outweigh the lure of large short-run profits. 
Managers of a cartel member who are thinking of cheating are 
faced with a choice between two alternatives. The first alternative is to 
continue cooperating in the cartel and take the sure profits that the 
firm has been garnerihg from the arrangement. The other alternative 
is to cheat, thereby making even higher profits. Unfortunately, this 
prospect of higher profits is coupled with a risk of diminished profits if 
full-scale competition erupts. Experimental psychology suggests that 
people (including business managers) are risk averse when it comes to 
potential gains. 137 The average person believes that, in the search for 
profits, the bird in the hand is better than two in the bush.138 The data 
generated by experimental psychology indicate that the typical man-
ager will choose to take the sure profits generated by continued coop-
eration in the cartel rather than run the risk of diminished profits 
should the attempt at cheating be discovered. The tendency of con-
temporary management to eschew risks (at least when not facing the 
prospect of a near-certain loss) suggests that managers will take the 
134. See note 128 supra and accompanying text. 
135. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text. 
136. See F. SCHERER, supra note 15, at 13-14. Moreover, the threat of diminished profits 
through open competition may be augmented by various strategic moves on the part of cartel 
members designed to "punish" cheaters. See Ayers, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of 
Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 295 (1987). 
137. See note 47 supra. 
138. S. MAITAL, supra note 23, at 198-200. 
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certain profits from continued cooperation rather than run the risks of 
full competition.139 
The threat to profits posed by the resumption of full-scale competi-
tion is not the only deterrent to managers considering cheating on col-
lusive arrangements. Full-scale competition introduces uncertainty 
into the previously comfortable world of the managers of a cartel 
member. Suddenly, managers must unilaterally make difficult deci-
sions on pricing and market strategy that were previously made jointly 
by the cartel. Moreover, the outcome of any such unilateral decisions 
may be quite uncertain. Uncertainty discomforts most human beings, 
including managers. 140 
Perhaps the most serious threat posed by the resumption of full-
scale competition is that it undermines the very ability of managers to 
pursue their own interests. As economist Harvey Leibenstein has 
pointed out, the more competitive a market, the less scope for manage-
rial discretion. 141 Managers, therefore, desire "shelters" from compe-
tition. As Professor Leibenstein put it: 
Monopoly gives license for a high degree of discretionary behavior. 
It is a license for some in powerful positions to be arbitrary, sloppy, bu-
reaucratic, arrogant and nonresponsive to the internal demands of other 
members of the firm. Competitive pressures do not eliminate such pos-
sibilities but they reduce the area of discretionary behavior. The obverse 
of license is obligation. Monopoly does not provide a sense of obligation 
for the monopolist to be considerate to fellow employees or to customers. 
Strictly speaking, neither does competition, but indirectly competition 
does provide pressures and incentives to do so. 142 
Managers of firms in cartels may avoid cheating on the cartel (or avoid 
taking the opportunity to engage in extracartel transactions if the car-
tel is loose enough to allow such transactions) in order to preserve the 
very shelters which allow them to pursue personal goals independent 
of the firm which employs them. While cheating on cartel arrange-
ments may be the winning move for a profit-maximizing firm, the 
threat to profits posed by full-scale competition, the increase in uncer-
tainty generated by such competition, and the desire to seek shelters 
from competition in order to pursue personal goals, all combine to 
make cheating on a cartel a less desirable alternative from the stand-
point of the manager seeking to advance his career. 
A micro-microeconomic approach to antitrust law also indicates 
139. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text. 
140. See D. KRECH, R. CRUTCHFIELD & N. LIVSON, ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 461 (3d 
ed. 1974). 
141. H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 23, at 207-08. 
142. Id. 
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that new entry is not a short-run panacea for collusive behavior among 
competitors. First, as mentioned, new entry into markets with 
supracompetitive profits generated by collusion is not as common as 
predicted by classical microeconomic models. 143 Second, co-optation 
of new entrants into the cartel is much easier than would be predicted 
by microeconomic models. A new entrant in a market dominated by a 
cartel can earn large profits by undercutting the cartel.144 However, 
the managers of the new entrant, in deciding whether to undercut the 
cartel, face the same personal risks as do the managers of an existing 
cartel member who are considering cheating on the cartel. Competi-
tion by the new entrant threatens to lower profits, create uncertainty, 
and undermine the atmosphere which allows managers to pursue per-
sonal goals. 145 Thus, while vigorous competition by the new entrant 
may be the preferred strategy for the theoretical profit-maximizing 
firm, the real-world managers who run the firm may view cooperation 
with the cartel as the best strategy. 
Finally, contrary to microeconomic theory, a micro-
microeconomic approach suggests that collusive arrangements among 
firms which ostensibly lack market power may cause competitive 
harm. Micro-microeconomic theory suggests that managers of firms 
seek shelters from competition not necessarily to increase profits, but 
to avoid pressures to minimize costs and to create a more permissive 
atmosphere for arbitrary behavior by those managers. 146 Short of at-
taining a monopoly or creating a cartel including all firms in the mar-
ket, the managers cannot create a completely sheltered environment. 
Nonetheless, managers are often content with "partial" shelters from 
what they believe is "excessive" competition.147 When managers of 
firms without market power enter into collusive arrangements with 
competitors, they may not be seeking to influence the market price for 
their firms' goods, but to create partial shelters from competition 
through neutralization of what they perceive to be the most salient 
source of competitive pressure on them. In effect, the managers are 
seeking limited "peace treaties" with the managers of their most in-
tense competitors. 
These treaties, even if concluded between firms with small market 
shares, run contrary to the basic mandate of the antitrust laws - that 
competitors compete vigorously on the merits of their products - and 
143. See notes 57-73 supra and accompanying text. 
144. See notes 125 & 128 supra and accompanying text. 
145. See notes 136-42 supra and accompanying text. 
146. See H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 23, at 228-30. 
147. Id. 
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ought to be objectionable on that ground alone. 148 Moreover, the 
implementation of such treaties injures consumers and societal pro-
ductive efficiency even where the "signatories" collectively lack mar-
ket power. For example, when the managers of two small firms enter 
into a collusive arrangement, they are most likely entering into a 
treaty with the managers of the firm which they view as placing the 
most competitive pressure on them. Micro-microeconomic theory 
suggests that even this "partial shelter" will allow the managers of the 
two firms to pursue wasteful and inefficient management policies or, 
as economist Harvey Leibenstein puts it, to generate "X-
inefficiencies." 149 
The economic problems created by the conclusion of collusive trea-
ties goes beyond the generation of internal inefficiencies. The ability to 
create the partial shelter does not depend on the ability to control 
overall price competition; it merely depends on the capacity to 
dampen what the managers perceive as the source of their most in-
tense competition. Thus, numerous individual treaties (as opposed to 
an all-encompassing cartel) may exist in a given market. This prolifer-
ation of treaties has the obvious effect of multiplying the X-inefficien-
cies in the firms entering into them. More significantly perhaps, a 
proliferation of collusive treaties can change the tone of a market from 
one of aggressive competition to one of "gentlemanly competition."150 
This change in market style can lead to an even greater opportunity 
for managers to pursue their inefficient personal goals because gentle-
manly competition is itself a shelter under which X-inefficiency can 
flourish. 
Micro-microeconomic theory also suggests that the costs of X-inef-
ficiencies generated under the protection of noncompetition treaties 
may be passed to consumers even if many firms in the market remain 
fully competitive. Classical microeconomic theory postulates that if a 
firm attempts to pass higher costs on to consumers, they will desert the 
firm for its lower-price competitors.151 Micro-microeconomic theory, 
148. Cf Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 
1140, 1154 (1981) (emphasizing preservation of the competition process as the key goal of the 
antitrust laws); Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Historical Restraints, 15 CALIF. L. 
REV. 835, 853 (1987) ("protecting the competitive process is what antitrust is about"). 
149. H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 23, at 228-30. 
150. "Gentlemanly competition" refers to a market in which the participants, while being 
ostensible competitors, do not compete vigorously, but are satisfied with earning a "good living" 
and not "rocking the boat." See Gerla, supra note 90, at 6 n.26. From the consumer's perspec-
tive, the presence of competitors engaged in gentlemanly competition can be extremely detrimen-
tal because the individual strategies and styles of competitors can be more important in yielding 
the lowest delivered cost to consumers than the aggregate number of firms in a market. See J. 
BOWER, THE Two FACES OF MANAGEMENT 182-83 (1983). 
151. E.g., R. BORK, supra note 1, at 92-93. 
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however, recognizes the common-sense reality that consumers often 
do not seek out the lowest price. Consumers, like firms, are neither 
profit-maximizers nor cost-minimizers. The unwillingness of consum-
ers to maximize their utility may be caused by a number of factors. 
First, consumer behavior may be more often characterized by habit 
and reflex than by careful calculation.152 A consumer may ignore a 
price increase occasioned by a collusive arrangement because the con-
sumer is acting on instinct rather than on cold calculation. Second, 
for emotional or practical reasons, it may not be worth the bother for 
the consumer to seek out new sources of supply. 153 Third, many con-
sumer transactions may not be made by the actual consumers them-
selves, but by their household agents. 154 While the actual consumer 
might be price sensitive, his agent may not be.155 For example, the 
person responsible for food preparation may be very cognizant of 
changes in the price of groceries. If, however, that person delegates 
the task of grocery shopping to someone else, the agent may be much 
more interested in factors such as the time shopping will consume or 
the ambience of the store than in the change in the price of groceries. 
In sum, consumers are not maximizers but are selectively rational. 
Therefore, they can be adversely affected even by small competitors 
who agree not to compete. 
The insights gleaned from a micro-microeconomic approach yield 
two important policy implications for the application of antitrust law 
to competitor collusion. First, the antitrust laws should be used to 
attack cartels. The problem of competitor collusion will not automati-
cally be solved by cheating or new entry.156 This suggestion should 
152. See G. KATONA, THE POWERFUL CONSUMER 139-45 (1960). 
153. Of course, the notion that consumers may pay a supracompetitive price because they 
cannot or will not search for a superior deal is theoretically alien to classical microeconomics; 
under the classical microeconomic model, consumers are assumed to possess perfect information. 
E.g., J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL AP-
PROACH 136-37 (3d ed. 1980). Even economists now recognize that the search for information 
by consumers entails its own costs and that because of these costs consumers may lack perfect 
information. As Professors Heilbroner and Thurow put it, 
Who has time to investigate which brand of toothpaste is really best or even tastes best? 
Even professional buyers, such as industrial purchasing agents, cannot know every price of 
every product, including all substitutes. 
The lack of information can be remedied, at least up to a point; but the remedy costs 
money or its equivalent - time. Few of us have the resources or patience to do a complete 
research job on every item we buy. Would it even be rational to do so? 
R. HEILBRONER & L. THUROW, UNDERSTANDING MICROECONOMICS 176 (4th ed. 1978). The 
technical economic term for the cost to consumers of acquiring information on alternative 
sources of supply is "search costs." E.g., Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis 
of lmpetfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 635 (1979). 
154. H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 23, at 196. 
155. See id. 
156. See notes 57-73 and 134-42 supra and accompanying text. 
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not be controversial. Indeed, even devotees of the Chicago School 
seem to agree with this proposition even though it runs contrary to 
their faith in efficient, self-correcting markets.157 
The second policy implication is more controversial: The antitrust 
laws should be used to attack cartels even where the members collec-
tively lack market power.158 Such combinations frustrate a basic value 
the antitrust laws were meant to promote - the competitive pro-
cess.159 A micro-microeconomic approach supplies additional reasons 
for attacking collusive arrangements among competitors lacking mar-
ket power. This approach suggests that these arrangements are eco-
nomically wasteful because they promote X-inefficiencies in firms16° 
and because they diminish competition by changing the tone of a mar-
ket from competitive to complacent.161 Consumers may bear the costs 
of such inefficiencies because they frequently behave in a non-profit-
maximizing fashion.162 
While the concept that market power should not be used as a sine 
qua non of antitrust liability may offend devoted followers of the Chi-
cago School, the concept is fully consistent with current Supreme 
Court antitrust jurisprudence. The Court, in the very same Term it 
decided Matsushita, reiterated its position that establishment of liabil-
ity for practices which were per se violations of the antitrust laws did 
not require proof that the defendants possessed market power. 163 A 
micro-microeconomic approach to antitrust law suggests that the 
Court is correct in this stance. Indeed, a micro-microeconomic ap-
proach to antitrust law suggests that the Court's most controversial 
decision in the price-fixing area in recent years, Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Medical Society, 164 was in fact correctly decided. 
In Maricopa, the State of Arizona challenged "maximum" price-
fixing arrangements involving doctors in two counties and the county 
medical societies to which the doctors belonged. Each medical society 
set up a "foundation" that established a schedule of maximum fees its 
157. See note 72 supra. 
158. For the position that antitrust law should not be used to attack combinations lacking 
market power, see Easterbrook, supra note 118, at 20-21. See also Note, Fixing the Price Fixing 
Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 729 (1983). 
159. See note 148 supra and accompanying text. 
160. See notes 146-49 supra and accompanying text. 
161. See note 150 supra and accompanying text. 
162. See notes 152-55 supra and accompanying text. 
163. FfC v. Indiana Fedn. of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2018-19 (1986). In fact, the Court 
went so far as to hold that even under a rule-of-reason analysis, the possession of market power 
by the defendants need not always be demonstrated. 106 S. Ct. at 2018-19. 
164. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
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members would charge. 165 The foundations negotiated arrangements 
with various insurance companies whereby member doctors treating 
patients insured by the companies would bill the insurance companies 
no more than the maximums set by the foundation and would agree to 
accept the payments from the insurance companies as payment in 
full.166 In a 4-3 decision, the Court held the arrangement to be a per 
se illegal maximum price-fixing arrangement.167 
The decision in Maricopa has occasioned a great deal of criti-
cism.168 Much of the thrust of this criticism is that the Court ignored 
the economic efficiencies that the maximum-fee arrangement allegedly 
generated and the utility of these efficiencies in containing rising 
health-care costs.169 What led the Court to reject these purported "ef-
ficiencies" was not perversity or ignorance, but a profound suspicion 
of the need for competing doctors to be engaging in health-care cost 
containment when a customer of the competitors (insurance compa-
nies) could perform the task as well or perhaps even better. As Justice 
Stevens noted: 
It is true that a binding assurance of complete insurance coverage -
as well ~ most of the respondents' potential for lower insurance premi-
ums - can be obtained only if the insurer and the doctor agree in ad-
vance on the maximum fee that the doctor will accept as full payment 
for a particular service. Even if a fee schedule is therefore desirable, it is 
not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing .... The [Arizona 
Comprehensive Medical/Dental Program for Foster Children] and the 
Blue Shield Plan challenged in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. 
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), indicate that insurers are capable 
not only of fixing maximum reimbursable prices but also of obtaining 
binding agreements with providers guaranteeing the insured full reim-
bursement of a participating provider's fee. 170 
The majority of the Court, in effect, viewed the foundations' efforts as 
the utilization of joint bargaining power by doctors to obtain terms 
from insurance companies which they could not obtain through a pro-
cess of free individual bargaining. 
165. 457 U.S. at 339-41. 
166. 457 U.S. at 341. 
167. 457 U.S. at 356-57. 
168. See, e.g., H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 132-34; Gerhart, supra note 1, at 344-48; 
Comment, Physician Maximum Fee Reimbursement Agreements: Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society, 31 EMORY L.J. 913 (1982). The Court's decision is not without its defenders. 
See, e.g., Richards, Antitrust and the Future of Cost Containment Efforts in the Health Profession, 
62 NEB. L. REV. 49, 70-85 (1983); Note, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society: Supreme 
Court Refuses to Immunize Doctors Against Sting of Sherman Act Section J, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 
1203. 
169. See H. HovENKAMP, supra note 14, at 132-33; Gerhart, supra note 1, at 346-47; Com-
ment, supra note 168, at 946-56. 
170. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 352-53 (footnotes omitted). 
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Justice Powell, in dissent, challenged the view that the doctors 
were utilizing joint bargaining power to coerce insurance companies 
into granting favorable terms: "[T]here is no evidence of opposition to 
the foundation plan by insurance companies . . . . Rather seven insur-
ers willingly have chosen to contract out to the foundations the task of 
developing maximum-fee schedules."171 Professor Hovenkamp has 
elaborated on Justice Powell's dissent by noting that the insurers 
would not have voluntarily entered into the foundation arrangement if 
the purpose of the arrangement had been to charge artificially high 
prices. 
For example, if the "maximum" price fixing agreement was really a dis-
guised minimum price fixing agreement why did the insurance compa-
nies agree to participate? The doctors and the health insurers stand in a 
vertical relationship. As a general rule an insurer is made worse off by a 
price increase that increases the amount of its insured risk. Just as auto-
mobile insurance companies are better off in a world of safe drivers and 
cheap auto body repair shops, health insurers are better off in a world of 
healthy people and inexpensive doctors. 172 
The mistake made by the dissenters in Maricopa and by Professor 
Hovenkamp is their assumption that because the rational profit-maxi-
mizing insurer would not voluntarily assent to cartel-level charges, the 
human managers of the insurers involved in Maricopa did not in fact 
assent. Perhaps rational profit-maximizing insurers would have no 
motive to assent. Real-world managers, however, do have a motive to 
accept artificially high health-care rates. 
Over the last few years, the managers of health insurers have been 
under a great deal of pressure to help in the effort to contain health-
care costs. 173 In particular, governmental authorities have pressured 
insurance company managers to assist in cost containment. 174 At the 
171. 457 U.S. at 361 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
172. H. HovENKAMP, supra note 14, at 133 (emphasis in original); see also Comment, supra 
note 168, at 945. 
173. In recent years, health-care costs have not only risen much faster than the general rate 
of inflation, but they have consumed an increasing share of gross national product. For a lucid 
and detailed exposition of the explosive growth of health-care costs, see Wing, American Health 
Policy in the 1980's, 36 CASE w. RES. L. REV. 608, 618-49 (1986). 
174. For example, in 1977 the Massachusetts state insurance department insisted that Massa-
chusetts Blue Cross/Blue Shield strictly limit the fees it paid to physicians as a condition of the 
department's approval of a rate-hike request. Law & Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: 
Individual Patients or Society?, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. I, 27 (1986). By 1982, Blue Shield's payments 
were 30% less than physician charges. Id. As Professors Law and Ensminger note, "Blue Shield 
imposed these limitations, at least in part, because it believed that the Commissioner of Insurance 
would'disapprove of its rates if Blue Shield did not aggressively limit physicians' fees." Id. State 
legislatures have also pressured insurers to engage in cost containment through legislation such 
as that requiring health insurance policies to contain insurer-paid, mandatory second opinion 
requirements for nonemergency surgery. E.g., Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477DD (1986); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-46.3 (West 1985). 
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same time, insurance company managers also may be under internal 
pressure to maximize short-term profits through health-care cost con-
tainment.175 One possible response to these pressures is for the man-
agers of insurers to obtain the type of cost-containment agreement that 
Justice Stevens described in his Maricopa opinion.176 While cost-con-
tainment agreements do seem to be the ideal solution for relieving ex-
ternal and internal cost-minimization pressures, they do have a 
number of serious disadvantages when viewed from the perspective of 
real-world insurance fund managers such as those involved in Mari-
copa. First, the managers may sincerely, albeit mistakenly, believe 
that their companies individually lack the bargaining "clout" to nego-
tiate such agreements.177 Second, negotiating cost-containment agree-
ments is a time-consuming and frustrating process. 178 Third, 
negotiating cost-containment agreements gives rise to ill feelings 
among health-care providers. Insurance managers probably do not 
relish generating ill will among a constituency with whom they have to 
175. D. Ward Kallstrom has suggested several reasons why bottom-line-conscious health-
insurance managers would want cost-containment agreements: (1) to reverse losses caused by 
skyrocketing health-care costs; (2) to allow their employer to capture a large segment of the 
health insurance market by offering low premiums; (3) to take the pressure for cost containment 
off the insurance companies and place it on doctors and hospitals; and (4) to make medical 
insurance plans consistent with the sensible insurance standard of restricting payouts. Kallstrom, 
Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 
DUKE L.J. 645, 648 n.9. 
However, we should not necessarily conclude that managers of insurers are in fact under 
significant internal pressure to minimize costs through cost-containment agreements. The 
health-care-insurance industry has long been accustomed to the practice of passing along higher 
health-care costs through increased premiums. See Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Inno-
vation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 339, 342-43. 
176. See text at note 170 supra. 
177. If insurance managers believed that individual insurers could not negotiate cost-contain-
ment agreements with providers, then they were probably wrong in that belief. In the last few 
years, individual insurers have negotiated such agreements. See Capron, Containing Health Care 
Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 708, 712 (1986). Several reasons may explain why managers would have held 
this erroneous belief. First, the belief attained the status of a nearly official ideology. The stated 
position of the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), the trade association for pri-
vately owned health insurers, was that no one insurer possessed sufficient bargaining leverage to 
negotiate cost-containment agreements with health-care providers and that Congress ought to 
pass an amendment to the antitrust laws to allow joint negotiations. Loos, What Can Stop the 
Contagion?, BEST'S REVIEW (Life & Health Ins. Ed.), Apr. 1984, at 35, 36. For a scholarly 
article defending the position of the HIAA in situations in which the insurer lacked monopsony 
power, see Gable & Monheit, Will Competition Plans Change Insurer-Provider Relationships?, 61 
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 614, 623-34 (1983). For an attack on the HIAA position, see 
Havighurst, supra note 175, at 328 n.121, 339-40. Second, insurance managers may have been 
reluctant to tamper with what they saw as the physician's professional discretion and expertise. 
Id. at 339. Third, managers may have been afraid that any competitive advantage they received 
from a cost-containment agreement could easily be duplicated by competitors. Id. 
178. The time and effort spent negotiating such agreements would yield little benefit to an 
insurer if its competitors could "free ride" by simply duplicating the pioneer insurer's agreement 
or if health-care providers could not price discriminate and simply reduced their rates for all 
patients. See Gable & Monheit, supra note 177, at 629-32; Havighurst, supra note 175, at 339. 
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deal regularly.179 Fourth, health-care providers have utilized, or 
threatened to utilize, various tactics designed to frustrate the attain-
ment of cost-containment agreements, such as claiming that compli-
ance with such agreements threatened the quality of care provided to 
patients, 180 declaring participation in such agreements to be unethical 
behavior,181 filing suits alleging that such agreements violate federal 
antitrust laws, 182 and threatening to unionize in order to bargain col-
lectively with insurers. 183 Provoking the use of any of these tactics 
cannot be an appealing prospect to managers of insurers. 
External pressures for cost containment and possible internal pres-
sures for cost minimization and improved profitability may leave man-
agers of many insurers with no choice but to endure the unpleasantries 
and use their employer's bargaining clout to obtain cost-containing 
agreements. The managers of the insurers involved in Maricopa did, 
however, have an alternative - i.e., to agree to the foundations' sys-
tem of "cost containment." This option allowed the managers to 
"have their cake and eat it too." On the one hand, they would seem to 
be making sincere efforts at cost containment with the assistance of the 
"socially responsible" medical community, thus dampening external 
pressures for cost containment as well as any possible internal pres-
sures to minimize costs.184 On the other hand, the managers, by ac-
cepting the foundations' fee schedule, would avoid the unpleasantries 
and difficulties engendered by other insurance companies' efforts at 
cost containment. From the managers' perspective, yielding to the 
foundation's disguised cartel-level pricing made a great deal of sense, 
even if it were not in their employers' long-term interests. Therefore, 
while the Maricopa majority's portrayal of the insurers as victims of a 
doctor's price-fixing cartel may not be credible in the theoretical world 
179. The unwillingness to irritate providers is especially acute when the insurers are attempt· 
ing to sell malpractice policies to the same providers. M. GREEN & J. BERRY, supra note 11, at 
317. 
180. See FfC v. Indiana Fedn. of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2020 (1986); Havighurst, supra 
note 175, at 312 n.39; Weller, Antitrust and Heath Care: Provider Controlled Health Plans and 
the Maricopa Decision, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 223, 229, 241 (1982). 
181. See Havighurst, supra note 175, at 312-13. 
182. See, e.g., Barry v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986); Brillhart v. Mutual Medical 
Ins. Inc., 768 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1985); Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985). 
183. See Kallstrom, supra note 175, at 679 n.143. 
184. The illusion of effective cost containment or cost minimization could easily have been 
generated. The foundation's physician fees were apparently less than or equal to the fees charged 
by many, if not all, nonfoundation members. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 133. Compared 
with what other physicians in the locality were charging, the managers of the insurers would 
have seemed to be doing well by accepting the foundation's fee schedule. However, the point of 
comparison should not be with nonfoundation physicians, but with physicians in locales where 
insurers have aggressively negotiated individual physician fee-limiting arrangements. 
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of profit-maximizing, cost-minimizing insurance companies, in the real 
business world of insurance company managers, the insurers may well 
have been victimized with the witting or unwitting cooperation of 
their own managers. 
IV. CONCLUSION - MICRO-MICROECONOMICS 
AS AN OPEN SYSTEM 
This article has attempted to begin constructing a micro-
microeconomic theory of antitrust law in which the key actors are the 
real-world human managers of firms rather than the theoretical profit-
maximizing firms posited by classical microeconomic theory. The 
words "begin" and "a" cannot be emphasized too strongly. The por-
trait of management behavior, which the micro-microeconomic ap-
proach set forth utilizes, is drawn from observations which are to a 
large extent both casual and anecdotal. 185 Micro-microeconomic the-
ory would be much stronger if its description of managerial behavior 
were based on much more systematic observations. Such observations 
from sociologists, psychologists, organizational behavior specialists, 
management specialists, economists, historians, lawyers, or anyone 
else all have a place in micro-microeconomics. These observations 
may completely contradict the views of management behavior put 
forth in this article and may call (or totally different conclusions with 
respect to antitrust law than the ones reached by this article. 
So long as the conclusions are based upon careful observation, we 
should welcome the refutation. What neither we nor antitrust courts 
should welcome is a confusion between models based on empirically 
untested assumptions and reality. 186 Unfortunately, in Matsushita the 
Supreme Court went quite far toward substituting the neat theoretical 
models of classical microeconomics for the complex and messy reality 
of facts which courts must sort out in an antitrust case. 187 If the Court 
continues along the road it trod in Matsushita, we will have a theoreti-
cally perfect microeconomic policy which is a disaster in the real 
world because it bears precious little relation to that world. 
185. See notes 42-48 supra and accompanying text. 
186. Even within the economics profession, voices are beginning to argue for a more empiri-
cally based discipline which discards the assumptions that other social scientists disproved de-
cades ago. E.g., s. MAITAL, supra note 23, at 261-74; L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS 
216-37 (1983). 
187. See Crew, supra note 13, at 11. 
